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CONTEMPORARY COMMERCE CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES OVER STATE TAXATION 1
THOMAS REED POWELL

The authoritative doctrine of the application of the commerce clause to state taxation is lucidly and delusively stated as
follows: State taxes on interstate commerce are an invalid regulation thereof; whether a tax is one on interstate commerce
depends upon whether such commerce is the subject that is taxed.
This leaves us with the problem in each case of finding out the
subject on which the tax falls. Here is where trouble begins.
The legal answers do not correspond with the economic answers.
An economist might think that a tax on net income from interstate commerce is a tax on interstate commerce, but the Supreme
Court thinks not.2 A plain man would think that a tax on gross
receipts from interstate commerce is a tax on interstate commerce. The Supreme Court would agree with the plain man's
statement, but would tell him that the gross receipts are not
'A conspectus of Supreme Court decisions 1922-1927. For similar reviews
of Supreme Court decisions on state taxation and the commerce clause from
II0 to 1922, see (1922), 22 COL. L. Rav. 133-150; (1918) 12 Am. POL. S. Riv.
29-32; (1919) I3 Am. POL. S. REV. 51-56; (I919) I3 Am.. POL. S. REV. 610-615;
(I920) ig MfIcH. L. REv. 30-34; (1922) 20 MIcH. L. REv. I44-I5O; (1923) 21
MIcH. L. REv. 195-199.
'See Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U. S. 165 (i9i8); United States Glue Co.
v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (igi8) ; Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37 (1920);
Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113 (920).
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taxed if the tax apparently thereon is a fair substitute for a
property tax 3 or if the gross receipts are merely the measure4
of a tax on the privilege of becoming a domestic corporation.
This enlightenment would carry with it the intimation that a
tax on property is not a tax on interstate commerce though the
property is assessed at a capitalization of its earnings from interstate commerce. So the plain man and the economist soon
learn that in plain, economic fact the states can tax interstate
commerce if they go about it in the right way. The problem
then reduces itself to one of drawing the lines between the right
ways and the wrong ways of taxing interstate commerce.
While we are told that a tax on property is not a tax on the
commerce in which it is engaged and from which it derives its
value, we are told also that property in course of interstate transit may not be taxed by a state. 5 When we examine the cases,
however, we find that cars and engines may move in interstate
commerce continuously and still be taxed if the state does not
tax more than its fair share,6 the test of fairness being one not
of interstate commerce but of jurisdiction. We have yet to learn
whether the distinction is one between vehicles and commodities
or whether in the cases thus far the commodities have not behaved in such a way as to enable a state to confine its grasp to a
fair share and thus avoid offence against canons of jurisdiction.
We shall know better when there comes to the Supreme Court
a case in which a state taxes oil in pipe lines and confines its tax
to the quantity of oil that it may rightly regard as within its
jurisdiction throughout the taxing year. If throughout the year
the pipes were full of oil moving in interstate commerce, it would
seem queer to exempt the oil when the pipes may be taxed at a
capitalization of what they earn because the oil flows through
them. Such a result, however, is to be expected, if the court
mechanically applies existing formulations and does not go beneath them to find considerations of economic substance.
'United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335 (1912).
"Railroad Co. v. Maryland, 2L Wall. 456 (U. S. 1875).
'Coe v. Errol, i16 U. S. 517 (1886).
'See Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (18gi), and
cases cited in note 67 infra.
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When the tax is concededly one on an act or series of acts,
on an occupation or on a privilege, the question used to be merely
whether the act or occupation thus taxed is interstate commerce
or something else. The state which names some interstate commerce enterprise as the subject of its tax invites frustration of
its hopes. States thus menaced have been careful to pick for
taxation some act or enterprise that is plainly not interstate commerce. They have thereby been enabled often to impose on that
subject the same specific tax that had been held invalid when
imposed on interstate commerce or on interstate and intrastate
commerce combined. 7 In recent years, however, the Supreme
Court has hinted that there is a limit to this," and it has definitely
held that it finds in the commerce clause a barrier to taxes on
intrastate commerce within the state that are measured by values
outside the state. 9
The vice in the assessment of extraterritorial values is the
vice of taxing what is not within the jurisdiction. This vice is
one which is frequently condemned under the Fourteenth Amendment. For all such vices the Fourteenth Amendment is the most
appropriate sarcophagus, and it might have been found adequate
for them had not the court got itself into the position of holding
that the power of the state to exclude foreign corporations from
local business carries with it the power to measure an excise on
such local business in various arbitrary ways. 10 The retreat from
this position was executed over the bridge of the commerce
clause, and the commerce clause has since been used to set limits
to the assessment of taxes which the clause does not entirely forbid. Thus it now appears that a tax on a good subject may be
a bad tax because measured in a bad way. The point may be
put differently by saying that the test of the subject which is
taxed is now at times the manner in which the amount of the
Kehrer v. Stewart, I97 U. S. 6o (1905).
U. S. 576 (1914).

Compare Ohio Tax Cases,

232

'General Ry. Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 5oo (1918); Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. ]Richmond, 249 U. S. 252 (1919); Postal Telegraph-Cable
Co. v. Fremont, 255 U. S. 124 (1921).
9
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. i (igio) ; Looney v.
Crane Co., 245 U. S. x78 (1917).

" Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305

(1892).
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tax is determined. Neither mode of statement gives us answers
to concrete questions, but both tell us that now we must stop,
look and listen where formerly we might forge ahead. This
twentieth-century development suggests the major division between the cases to be considered. This separates the cases in
which the issue is one of taxability from those in which the issue
is one of the amount of the tax or the manner of arriving at it."
I.

ISSUES OF TAXABILITY

The taxes and the enterprises to be considered are of various kinds, and the problem of arranging the cases is one that
may well receive different solutions from different arrangers. I
have chosen to start with a group of cases which together trace
the power of the state to impose taxes on property or on dealings with it prior to its start on an interstate journey, while it is
on a journey, and after it has arrived in the state of destination.
Then follow cases dealing with taxes on doing business, in which
the question is whether the business in question is exclusively
interstate or partly intrastate. Next come cases in which the
complainant is concededly engaged in interstate commerce and
the question is whether the taxes are of a sort that interstate
commerce enterprises may be forced to bear. These involve
issues whether the demand may be justified as a charge for facilities furnished by the state, whether the tax is measured by net
income or by gross income from interstate commerce, and
whether it is measured by gross income from interstate commerce
or from an activity prior to such commerce.
A so-called severance tax of Louisiana ca'me before the court
in Lacoste v. Department of Conservation12 and was sustained
as not a burden on interstate commerce-even if all the hides taken
from fur-bearing animals are shipped out of the state. The state
'For general articles on the relation between the commerce clause and
state taxation see Lay, The Commerce Clause of the Constitution--Its History
and Development, (1926) 6o Am. L. Rav. 161; Walter, Freedom of Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, (1926) I ALA. L. REV. 57; and Watkins, Local State

Government as Affected by the Commerce Clause, (1925) 98 CENT. L. J. 114.
2263 U. S. 545 (924), noted in (1924) 22 MiCr. L. Rav. 61g.
The decision below is discussed in Vaughan, The Severance Tax, 7 Bum-. NAT. TAX
Ass'N 243.

STATE TAXATION CONTROVERSIES

court had declared the law to be an exercise of the police power
having for its object the conservation and protection of furbearing animals and alligators and had called the tax a condition
precedent to the divestiture of the state's title in its wild game
and to the transfer of that title to the dealer called upon to pay
the tax. This theory of the law was accepted by the Supreme
Court in the exercise of its independent judgment. The tax
amounted to two per cent of the value of the hides and was
assessed to the dealers and not to the trappers. This was declared by Mr. Justice Butler to be merely for convenience in order
to make certain that all the skins will be found for taxation.
His opinion puts to one side the possibility that the tax "might
be upheld by virtue of the power of the state to prohibit, and
therefore to condition, the removal of wild game from the state,"
and declares broadly:
"Expressly, the tax is imposed upon all skins and hides
taken within the state. This includes those, if any sold for
manufacture in the state as well as those shipped out. In
their argument here, plaintiffs in error stated that skins and
hides are not manufactured into finished products in Louisiana, and that all are shipped out of the state. But that is
no objection to the tax. The state's power to tax property
is not destroyed by the fact that it is intended for and will
move in interstate commerce. Such skins and hides may be
taxed in the hands of dealers before they move in interstate
commerce." 13
1 263 U. S. 545, 550-551.
Considerations of the question whether a federal
tax is in the forbidden class of a tax on exports may indicate similar rulings with

respect to state taxes as invalid regulations of interstate commerce. In Spalding
& Brothers v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66 (1923), the federal tax on certain named
athletic supplies "sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer" was held inapplicable to a sale by an American dealer upon an order given by an American
commission merchant under which the dealer marked the outside container with
the name and address of a foreign merchant, delivered the goods to a steamship
company, received from it a receipt which it delivered to the American commission merchant who exchanged it for a bill of lading from the carrier and
who paid the American dealer. Thus the fact that the American commission
merchant technically acquired the title and paid the dealer was held insufficient
to outweigh the fact that the dealer delivered the articles directly to the carrier
for shipment abroad. Possibly more weight would be given to the technical
situation if such a sale of goods destined for a sister state claimed immunity
under the silent voice of the commerce clause when there is involved no explicit
constitutional exemption as there is in the case of a federal tax on exports.
Similar technical elements in the state of destination were deemed controlling in
Banker Brothers Co. v. Pennsylvania, 222 U. S. 210 (1911), which is not mentioned in the principal case.
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A similar tax on'the occupation of mining ore was sustained
in Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord.14 There was dispute whether
the tax was a property tax or an excise tax. The court called it
the latter. It was in terms imposed on those engaged in the
business of mining or producing ore. The assessment was six
per cent of the value of the ore, and the tax was explicitly declared to be in addition to all other taxes. Such a tax is clearly
invalid if imposed on interstate sales or interstate transportation.
Complainants contended that their mining was so closely connected with interstate commerce as to make th" tax in substance
one on such commerce. They relied on the facts that most of
their ore was mined to fulfil existing contracts with consumers
in other states and that the ore from open-pit mines is shovelled
directly from the beds to the cars that take it to other states and
that the continuity of the journey from the underground mines is
nearly as complete. In answer to these arguments and contentions
Mr. Justice Van Devanter declared:
"Plainly the facts do not support the contention. Mining is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing is
a local business, subject to local regulation and taxation.
Its character in this regard is intrinsic, is not affected
by the intended use or disposal of the product, is not controlled by contractual engagements, and persists even though
the business be conducted in close connection with interstate commerce ...
"The ore does not enter interstate commerce until after
the mining is done, and the tax is imposed only in respect
of the mining. No discrimination against interstate commerce is involved. The tax may indirectly and incidentally
affect such commerce, just as any taxation of railroad and
telegraph lines does, but this is not a forbidden burden or
interference." 15
14262 U. S. 172 (1923).
See Powell, State Production Taxes and the
Commerce Clause, (1923) 12 CAl. L. REV. 17, which discusses also Heisler v.
Thomas Colliery Co., note 16 infra.
( 262 U. S. 172, 178-179.
Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284
(1927), to be considered more in detail later, involved a tax on persons producing oil and natural gas, in which it was conceded that "the state may lay a
privilege or occupation tax upon producers of natural gas reckoned according to
the value of that commodity at the well." The question in the case was whether
the state had confined itself to the value at the well.
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The Pennsylvania property tax of two and one-half per
cent on the value of anthracite coal when mined, washed,
screened or otherwise prepared for the market was held in Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 16 to be immune from criticism under
the commerce clause notwithstanding the protest from other
states that the greater part of Pennsylvania's anthracite went to
other states and that the Governor of the Commonwealth in advocating the tax had announced that the burden would be borne
almost wholly by consumers in other states owing to Pennsylvania's monopoly of anthracite beds. Mr. Justice McKenna
adduced precedents sustaining taxation of commodities before
they begin their interstate journey and declared the case at bar
to be within them, whatever might have been the motive in imposing the tax and whatever might be the extent of Pennsylvania's monopoly in thie selected article. On the contention that
"the products of a state that have, or are destined to have, a market in other states, are subjects of interstate commerce, though
they have not moved from the place of their production or preparation," he had this to say:
"The reach and consequences of the contention repel
its acceptance. If the possibility, or, indeed, certainty, of
exportation of a product or article from a state, determines
it to be in interstate commerce before the commencement
of its movement from the state, it would seem to follow
that it is in such commerce from the instant of its growth
or production; and in the case of coals, as they lie in the
ground. The result would be curious. It would nationalize
all industries; it would nationalize and withdraw from state
jurisdiction and deliver to federal commercial control the
fruits of California and the South, the wheat of the West
and its meats, the cotton of the South, the shoes of Massachusetts, and the woolen industries of other states, at the
very inception of their production or growth; that is, the
fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat ungathered, hides and
flesh of cattle yet 'on the hoof,' wool yet unshorn, and coal
yet unmined, because they are, in varying percentages,
2

260 U. S. 245 (1922), considered in (1923) 96 CENT. L. J. 18;
Wis. L. REv. 187; and (1923) 32 YAT.E L. J.4o6.

(1923)
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destined for and surely to be exported to states other than
those of their production." 17
It is settled that after property has actually begun to move
on an interstate journey it is immune from state taxation until
its journey is ended or interrupted. A physical interruption
which is regarded as necessarily incident to the mode of transit
is not deemed a break in the journey. Such was thought to be
the situation in Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro18 in which
Mr. Chief Justice Taft stated the applicable rules as follows:
"The interstate commerce clause of the Constitution
does not give immunity to movable property from local taxation unless it is in actual continuous transit in interstate
commerce. When it is shipped by a common carrier from
one state to another, in the course of such an uninterrupted
journey, it is clearly immune. The doubt arises when there
are interruptions in the journey, and when the property, in
its transportation, is under the complete control of the owner
during the passage. If the interruptions are only to promote
the safe or convenient transit, then the continuity of the
interstate trip is not broken." 19
The case at bar involved logs floated down a small Vermont
stream to its mouth and retained by a boom at its junction with
the Connecticut until the waters of the Connecticut should subside sufficiently to permit the logs to be sent down that stream
to a mill in New Hampshire. The Vermont court had thought
that the interstate journey did not begin until the logs started
anew on the Connecticut River and that the halt at the mouth of
the tributary, although only long enough to secure the safety of
the drive, was for the benefit of the owner, and so in law post17
260 U. S. 245, 259-260. State police regulations were found to offend the
commerce clause in Flanagan v. Federal Coal Co., 267 U. S. 222 (1925), when
applied to a sale completed by delivery to a carrier and consignment to subpurchasers in another state, and in Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189
(1925), when applied to a purchase of grain completed by delivery to the purchaser within the state when the purchaser habitually ships the grain in short
order to points without the state.
1'26o U. S. 366 (1922), discussed in (1923) 22 MicEr. L. REv. 6.3; (1923)
71 U. OF PA. L. REv. 279; and (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 849.
i26o U. S. 366, 376.
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poned the initial step in the interstate journey. The Supreme
Court thought otherwise. It regarded the halt as due wholly
to the requirements of the transportation system, influenced by
the fact that the lower boom in New Hampshire was strong
enough to hold the full annual supply of the mill as soon as the
spring freshets subsided and by the fact that logs sent after early
April did not halt at all in their journey. Against this might be
weighed the considerations that a stronger boom in New Hampshire might possibly have enabled all the logs to be sent straight
down to their destination so that the Vermont boom at the mouth
of the small stream was a convenient substitute for a more expensive terminal facility in New Hampshire, and that the intermediate boom also facilitated more convenient methods of collecting the logs for their journey. These considerations are not.
very strong if the immunity of property in transit has any compelling justification. The Chief Justice takes the rule of immunity for granted and does not go beyond citing the decisions
which have established it. It is on the basis -of precedent also
that he applies the rule to immunity from the state of origin,
without considering whether that state is entitled to more favorable consideration than an intermediate or terminal state.
The decision indicates that modes of obviating difficulties in existing natural means of communication are regarded as part of
the transportation facilities and not as factors outside of transit.
The preceding case was the basis of the decision in Hughes
Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota20 in which the state of origin was
forbidden fo tax logs assumed to have been started on their interstate journey prior to tax day. Before May i, the date of
assessment, the logs were piled on the ice or the banks of the
Swamp River in Minnesota. On April 29, the ice broke and the
drive began. Eighteen days later the logs reached the boom at
the mouth of the Pigeon River where it enters Lake Michigan.
At this point they were picked up by a purchaser who put them on
2072 U. S. 469 (1926), noted in (1927) 25 MICir. L. REv. 559. For other
discussions of taxation of property in transit see notes in (i927) 36 HAv. L.
Rsv. 112 and (1927) II M NN. L. Rnv. 368 on oil stored in tanks after being
taken from a steamer from abroad; in (1927) 15 Ky. L. J. 153 on temporary
presence in the state of cars of a foreign railroad; and in (x924) 22 MIcE. L.
REv. 739 on oil in pipe lines.
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boats. The contract between the parties called for delivery at
the mouth of the Pigeon River and payments prior to that time
gave the purchaser an interest in the logs. The case holds that
the interstate journey began at the gathering point in the Swamp
River and that its start was not postponed until the logs were
transferred from the mouth of the Pigeon River to the vessels
which carried them to the Michigan mill. To quote from Mr.
Chief Justice Taft:
"It is clear that the entrepot or depot for the interstate shipment of the logs was in the Swamp River. The
drive in the two rivers, though under the direction of the
timber company, was not gathering the logs for subsequent
interstate shipment, it was the interstate movement itself.
Both parties intended interstate shipment, they had bound
themselves to it, the logs were segregated and were moving
in the contemplated journey which neither could prevent if
they carried out their agreement. The delays in the continuity of movement were only incidental to the journey and
the necessary change in the mode of transportation by which
the logs were carried from a place in one state to a place
agreed upon in another." 21
This is all clear enough, but what puzzles is the failure of the
Chief Justice to tell when the logs on the bank of the Swamp
River were pushed into the stream. The logs on the ice did not
start until two days prior to tax day, and unless the logs on the
bank were all pushed into the stream in two days, the case exempts
all of the logs when only part of them were in the river and
had begun their movement. That this was not intended by the
court may be inferred from the fact that the Chief Justice says
that the entrepot for the interstate shipment was "in" the river.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that all the logs on the bank
could have been shoved into the stream on the day when the
ice broke and the day thereafter. The case makes us curious
also whether the logs would have been deemed to be "in" the
river when they were on the ice before it broke. A negative answer
would seem to be required by the leading case on the subject in
272 U. S. 469, 475.
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which logs in a tributary stream waiting for high water were held
taxable, 22 but later decisions have shown an increasing tendency
to spread the mantle of interstate commerce over what once might
have been thought to be local prefaces or postscripts. 23 In the
principal case the Chief Justice says that the character of the
shipment "depends upon all the evidential circumstances looking
to what the owner has done in the preparation for the journey
and in carrying it out", and weight is given to the fact that the
timber company was bound by contract to send the logs on their
interstate way.
The tortuous course of decisions on state taxation of goods
of extra-state origin has been noted in predecessors of this review. While the court early held that such goods from sister
states are subject to the general property tax even though still
in their original packages 24 and that they are not immune from
inspection fees which do not materially exceed the cost of inspection, 25 it was later led by the implications of the qualification
in this second decision to declare that goods of extra-state
origin while still in the original package are immune from a tax
on their sale 26 or on the occupation of selling them.2 7

Con-

temporaneously, however, an occupation tax was held validly
levied on a person who peddled goods of extra-state origin in
their original package without solicitation or orders prior to their
introduction into the state. 28 Even when a little later one of
the opinions indicated clearly enough that henceforth the court
was going to sustain a sales tax where it would sustain a property
'Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517 (1886).
Compare Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Settle, 260 U. S. 166 (1922), with
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Texas, 2o4 U. S. 4o3 (1907).
"4 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885), following intimations in
Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1869).

= Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agriculture, 17, U. S.

345 (1898).

=Foote v. Stanley,

232 U.

S. 494

REV. 134; Standard Oil Co. v. Graves,
tinental Oil Co., 256 U. S. 642

reviewed in (1922) 22 CoL L.
S. 389 (1919); Bowman v. Conreviewed in (1922) 2o MicH. L.

(1914),
249 U.

(192I),

REv. i49.
19

'Askren v. Continental Oil Co., 252 U. S. 444 (I92O), reviewed in (192o)
Mica. L. REv. 32.
"Wagner v. Covington, 251 U. S. 95 (1gig), reviewed in (192o) ig MIcH.

L. REV. 31.
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tax, 29 there was a recession to the earlier befuddlement in pointing
out that an earlier case did not go farther than to confer exemption from a sales tax while the goods were still in the original
package. °
Here was confusion that cried aloud for dispersion. Its cry
was answered by Mr. Chief justice Taft in Sonneborn Brothers
v. Keeling-" which declared beyond peradventure of doubt that
goods which have arrived in the state in advance of negotiation
for their sale are subject to a sales tax as well as a property tax.
The tax sustained in the case was one on the occupation of selling oil assessed at two per cent of the gross amount of sales
whether collected or uncollected. After stating the facts the
Chief Justice declared:
"The question we have to decide is whether oil transported by appellants from New York or elsewhere outside of
Texas to their warerooms or warehouse in Texas, there held
for sales in Texas in original packages of transportation, and
subsequently sold and delivered in Texas in such original
packages, may be made the basis of an occupation tax upon
appellants, when the state tax applies to all wholesale dealers
in oil engaged in making sales and delivery in Texas.
"Our conclusion must depend on the answer to the question: Is this a regulation of, or a burden upon, interstate
commerce? We think it is neither. The oil had come to a
state of rest in the warehouse of the appellants, and had become a part of their stock with which they proposed to do
business as wholesale dealers in the state. The interstate
transportation was at an end, and whether in the original
packages or not, a state tax upon the oil as property, or
upon its sale in the state, if the state law levied the same tax
on all oil or all sales of it, without regard to its origin, would
be neither a regulation nor a burden of the interstate commerce of which this oil had been the subject." 32
"Texas Co. v. Brown, 258 U. S. 466, 476 (1922), reviewed in (1923) 21
MIcH. L. REv. i97-199.
,0Texas Co. v. Brown, supra note 29 at 476.
' 262 U. S. 5o6 (I923), discussed in (1923) 37 HARv. L. REv. 157; (1924)
2 Tax. L. REv. 25o; and (1924) 32 YAiE L. J. 849. The same problem is dealt
with in (1923) 37 H.Av. L. REv. 265.
262 U. S. 5o6, 5o8-5og.
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The opinion then goes on to review the cases which have established the taxability of property so situated, as contrasted with
property which because of foreign origin is still technically an
import, and the cases which have sustained sales taxes or occupation taxes. Cases forbidding state prohibitions of the sale of
goods of extra-state origin while still in the original package are
distinguished by pointing out that such prohibition "plainly interferes with or destroys the commerce", while the tax on the
sale "merely puts the merchandise on an equality with all other
merchandise in the state and constitutes no real hindrance to introducing the merchandise into the state for sale upon the basis
of equal competition." In dealing with the recent decisions which
had created the confusion on the subject, the Chief Justice says
that in none of them did it clearly appear from the statement of
facts that the articles had arrived in the taxing state without
previous negotiations with possible customers. He tells us that
counsel were remiss in the matter of making clear the factual
situations. Yet he recognizes candidly that the opinions had used
language which indicated that sales in original packages may not
be taxed and thereby contained implications which cannot be
sustained. He leaves us with no doubt as to the future when he
says that "upon full consideration and after a reargument, we
cannot think that this extension of the exemption referred to,
if intended to apply to oil sold after arrival within the state, to
be justified either in reason or in previous authority; and to this
extent the opinions in the cases cited are qualified." Mr. Justice
McReynolds adds a brief concurring opinion which calls the result
"out of harmony with the theory upon which recent opinions
proceed" but accepts it as probably harmless and possibly good.
It evidently disturbs him to have one rule for goods from abroad
and another for goods from sister states and to allow taxation
of the latter while they are still immune from police power, but
he ends up by observing that "logic and taxation are not always
the best of friends."
The Chief Justice does not mention the case of Phipps v.
Cleveland Refining Co. which was argued and decided between
'26I

U. S. 449

(1923).
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the reargument and the decision of the Sonneborn case. The
Phipps case involved an Ohio oil inspection law with a scale of
fees which yielded so much in excess of the cost of enforcement
as to make it amount to a fiscal measure. Concededly such a
tax law cannot be applied to oil which enters the state in response
to prior orders. This may be all, that the court means to hold,
for Mr. Justice McKenna reports that the bill of the complainant
states that it "buys its products in other states, ships them into
Ohio, and receives at its place of business large quantities of them"
and "has contracts for them which it is bound to consummate,
and which it cannot perform without great loss, except through
its established business." This is by no means an explicit statement that the contracts are made before the oil enters the state,
and it implies that the oil is delivered from within the state and
not from without the state and therefore negatives the contrary
implication possible from a subsequent reference to "interstate
inspection" as distinguished from "intrastate inspection." There
is no reference to original packages in the opinion, most of which
consists of quotation from the opinion of the court below and
approving comment thereon. It is therefore impossible to say
with any confidence what the Supreme Court thought that it was
deciding. It is clear, however, that the District Court was following earlier erroneous intimations of the Supreme Court, for
it declared that
"where goods

.

.

.

are transported in original pack-

ages from other states into this, interstate commerce in such
goods is not completely terminated, and they are protected
by the commerce clause of the Constitution against excessive
inspection fees, until after their sale at the point of destination within the state." 34
This passage is not quoted by Mr. justice McKenna, but he refers to the District Court's reliance on earlier Supreme Court
decisions invalidating excessive inspection fees, and he gives
no hint that within two months the Supreme Court is going to
hold squarely that fees in excess of the cost of inspection may be
" Cleveland Refining Co. v. Phipps, 277 Fed. 463, 467 (S. D. Ohio

1921).
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collected as a tax on sales of original packages brought into the
state in advance of orders. His disposition of the case was doubtless influenced largely by the fact that counsel for the state confined themselves to contending that the profit was made on the
"intrastate inspection" and not on the "interstate inspection." Possibly counsel in this case as in some of the earlier ones deserve
censure for inadequate presentation of the facts, but it seems
clear that if this case had been held by the court until the writing of the opinion in the Sonneborn case, it would either have
been decided in favor of the state on the ground that the complainant did not clearly allege that its sales of designated oil had
been made before the oil arrived in the state or else would have
been sent back to the court below to ascertain whether that was
the fact, with instructions to decide in favor of the state if the
sales took place after arrival even though delivery was in the
original packages. 3r
The familiar principle that the commerce clause does not
negative a state excise tax on intrastate business even though
the enterpriser is also engaged in interstate business was applied in
"The question whether acts subsequent to interstate transportation are to
be deemed incidental to the prior interstate sale or transportation or are to be
regarded as an independent transaction or as ancillary to subsequent noncommercial ventures arises in connection with the application of state police
statutes as well as in connection with state taxes. It was in connection with
the duty to secure a license before doing business that the court held in Kansas
City Structural Steel Co. v. Arkansas, 269 U. S. 148 (1925), that an extra-state
concern which ships to itself within the state materials for bridge construction
and delivers those materials to a sub-contractor for use on the foundations for
the bridge may be fined for not having a license to do business. The company in
question had before this time made a bid for the construction of the bridge, had
secured the contract and executed a bond for its performance, but Mr. Justice
Butler does not consider whether these acts alone would constitute the doing
of intrastate commerce for which a license may be required. His opinion is
not wholly clear because it seems to convey the idea that the delivery of the
materials is not interstate commerce and is therefore enough to make the
deliverer subject to the requirement of a license, and at the same time it says
that all the things taken together certainly constitute or include intrastate business. The company secured a license before it began to erect the bridge, but
was fined $iooo for not having secured a license earlier. Mr. Justice Stone
dissented without opinion. The case is discussed in Newbold, The "Local Transaction" i; Interstate Commerce, (1926) 12 IowA L. REV. 30; and notes in
(1926) 14 Cr. L. REV. 334 and (1926) 39 HIARv. L. REv. 489, 511. Similar
situations arising in connection with taxing as well as police power are discussed in Isaacs, Activities Subsequent to Interstate Commerce, (1927) 25 MIcH.
L. REV. 74o, and a note in (1927) 2 IND. L. J. 688 on a contract to install and
deliver an ammonia compressor.
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Raley & Brothers v. Richardson"I to sustain a flat fee of $ioo
on brokers and commission merchants. Though the statute was
general in terms, the state court had construed it as confined to
intrastate business and the Supreme Court accepted this as though
it had been explicitly provided in the statute. Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that it does not matter that the local business
is small in comparison with the interstate business nor that the
two are conducted together in the same establishment, since "one
cannot avoid a tax on a taxable business by also engaging in a
nontaxable business." He suggested that a different question
would arise if the two businesses were not distinct but the local
7
a mere incident of the interstate.3

Where, however, the business is exclusively interstate, a
flat license tax may not be imposed. This finds application in
Real Silk Hosiery Mills v. Portland38 in the case of solicitors
going from house to house to obtain orders for stockings to be
shipped from outside the state directly to purchasers. The solicitors operated under an arrangement with the extra-state manufacturer whereby the solicitors paid their own expenses and received their compensation in the form of an advance payment
from the purchaser, which payment was deducted from the purchase price which the manufacturer later collected through the
parcel post plan of c. o. d. shipments. This method of paying
the solicitors was declared by Mr. Justice McReynolds not to
differentiate the situation from those in which the solicitors are
employees who travel at the expense of the vendor and get their
pay by direct remittances from him. The fees imposed by the
"264 U.

S. 157 (1924).

""On each express company transporting freight or passengers from one
point in this state to another in this state," Mississippi imposed a tax of $5oo
plus $6 a mile on all first-class railroads on which business is done and $3 per
mile on second and third-class railroads. This was sustained in Southeastern
Express Co. v. Miller, 264 U. S. 535 (1924), against complaints founded on
the Fourteenth Amendment. The company did not adduce the commerce clause.
Presumably it was not in a position to contend that the tax was so high in view
of the local business that it was in substance a burden on interstate business, or
else the attorneys did not know that the court has intimated that it will inquire
into such a complaint when raised under the commerce clause.
us268 U. S. 325 (1925), discussed in Hemphill, The House to House Canvasser in Interstate Commerce, (1926) 6o Am. L. Ray. 641, and a note in
(1925) 4 TEx. L. Rav. iio. The decision in the court below is dealt with in
(1924)

ii VA. L. REv. 141.
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ordinance were $12.5o quarterly for persons on foot and $z 5
quarterly for those using a vehicle and were thus more- than
merely compensatory for the police supervision of issuing the
licenses and securing a bond conditioned on making final delivery of the ordered goods.
A closely similar situation provoked diversity of opinion in
Texas Transport Co. v. New Orleans39 which involved steamship agents for shipowners engaged exclusively in interstate and
foreign commerce. The majority, through Mr. Justice Sutherland, relied on earlier precedents to hold that such service cannot be made the subject of a state tax. Mr. Justice Brandeis
sought to differentiate the precedents on the ground that. the
agents in this case were independent contractors with their own
established business and not employees of the transporters and
that their services were not limited to the solicitation of business
but included the handling of various details incident to the facilitation of the shipments. He adds, however, that if his suggested differentiation is rejected, the precedent deemed in point
should be overruled as inconsistent with the underlying principle of later cases. This principle he outlines and applies by
saying:
"From the multitude of cases, this general rule may
be deduced. The validity of a state tax under the commerce
clause does not depend upon its character or classification.
It is not void merely because it affects or burdens interstate commerce. The tax is void only if it directly burdens
such commerce, or (where the burden is indirect) if the
tax discriminates against or obstructs interstate commerce.
In this case there is no claim that interstate commerce is
discriminated against or obstructed. The contention is
that the tax imposes a direct burden. Whether this burden
should be deemed direct depends upon the character of
plaintiff's occupation and its relation to interstate transac-

tions.

...

"It is settled law that interstate commerce is not directly burdened by a tax imposed upon property used exclusively in interstate commerce . . . ; or by a tax upon
'264

U. S. SO

(,924).
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net income derived exclusively from interstate commerce
; or-by an occupation tax, fixed in amount, although
the business consists exclusively of selling goods brought
from another state . .
"The New Orleans tax is obviously not laid upon property moving in interstate commerce. Nor does it, like a
gross-receipts tax, lay a burden upon every transaction. It
is simply a tax upon one of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. It is no more a direct burden than is'a
tax on other indispensable instrumentalities; upon the ship;
upon the pilot boat which she must employ; upon the wharf
at which she must load and unload; upon the office which
the owner would have to hire for his employees if, instead
of engaging the services of an independent contractor, he
had preferred to perform those duties himself." 40
Only Mr. Justice Holmes joined in the dissent. The majority do not discuss the possible signifiance of the facts that these
agents were not employees and that their activities were not confined to soliciting business. The tax in issue was a specific one
of $4oo assessed under a statute which graded enterprises according to the amount of business done. The successful complainant in the case enjoyed annual receipts in excess of $ioo,000.

There was division of opinion also in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania 41 in which Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone agreed
with the Pennsylvania court in sustaining on police grounds a
state statute which required licenses of independent brokers who
sell steamship tickets. There was an annual license fee of $50
which the state court had found to yield no more to the state
than the cost of supervising the business and the licensees. The
majority through Mr. Justice Butler reversed the state court and
saved unlicensed agents from the conviction which the state court
had sustained, saying that "the sales here in question are re'264 U. S. 150, 155-,57.
4273
U. S. 32 (927), considered in (1927)
o0 CENT. L. J. 94; (1927)
27 CoL. L. REv. 573; (1927) 22 ILL. L. Ray. i97; (1927) 26 MICH. L. REv.
102; (927)
5 No. CAP. L. REV. 254; (927) i TEMP. L. Q. 155; (927) 5 TEX.
L. REV. 318; and (1927) 36 YALE L. J. 7o6. In (1926) 74 U. OF. PA. L. Rv.

624 is a note on the decision in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and in
(0925) 74 U. oF PA. L. REV. 92, a note on the decision in the lower state court.
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lated to foreign commerce as directly as are sales made in ticket
offices maintained by the carriers and operated by their servants
and employees" and that "the license fee and other things imposed by the Act on plaintiff in error, who initiates for his principals a transaction in foreign commerce, constitute a direct
burden on that commerce."
An annual franchise tax on doing business in corporate
form assessed at the rate of one-tenth of one per cent on the
par value of the capital stock and surplus employed in business
in the taxing state was held in Ozark Pipe Line Corporation v.
Monier 42 to be an unconstitutional regulation of interstate
commerce when imposed upon a foreign corporation engaged
exclusively in interstate transportation of oil and in acts deemed
to be wholly incidental to such interstate transportation. Again
Mr. justice Sutherland relies on the doctrinal precedents
that interstate commerce is not a taxable subject. He dismisses
as immaterial the facts that the company under its charter had
the privilege of engaging also in intrastate transportation and
that it had a license and the power of eminent domain, saying
that "these facts could not have the effect of conferring upon the
state an authority, denied by the federal Constitution, to regulate interstate commerce." This might have been more palatable
if the Constitution had in fact denied that power instead of
saying nothing about it. In dissenting, Mr. Justice Brandeis
observes that he finds
"in the commerce clause no warrant for thus putting a state
to the choice of either abandoning the corporate franchise
tax or discriminating against intrastate commerce, nor for
denying to a state the right to encourage the conduct of business by natural persons through imposing, for the enjoyment
of the corporate privilege, an annual tax so small that it cannot conceivably be deemed an obstruction of interstate commerce."
He finds a tax upon the franchise as indirect as a tax on the
pipe line or on the net income therefrom. The majority, how42266 U. S. 555 (I9"5), discussed in (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 5o6; (925)
38 HAlv'. L. REv. 1116; (1925) ig Ili. L. REv. 665; and (1925) 3 Tax. L.
REv. 454.
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ever, stick to old doctrine in holding that a tax on doing business needs some local business to lay hold of in order to Avoid
running afoul of judicial vocalizations of the silence of the commerce clause with respect to state power over interstate commerce.
The same doctrine is applied in Alpha Portland Cement Co.
v. Massachusetts 43 to save a foreign corporation engaged exclusively in interstate commerce from an excise on the privilege
of doing business in corporate form. Part of the excise was
measured by what was estimated to be that part of the "corporate excess" employed in Massachusetts, and part by that part
of the total net income deemed to be derived from business in
Massachusetts. Massachusetts seems to use "corporate excess"
in some Pickwickian sense for it estimates it by taking such proportion of the cash value of the total capital stock "as the value
of the assets, both real and personal, employed in any business
within the Commonwealth . . . bears to the value of the total
assets of the corporation." It also in estimating its own share
of the total gross receipts, which are used in the allocation of onethird of the total net income, takes as its own all sales except
those negotiated by agents or agencies chiefly domesticated in
other states, thus assuming that all business obtained through
Massachusetts headquarters is Massachusetts business, irrespective of where the products are made, sold or delivered. Any question, however, of taxation of extraterritorial values seems to be
out of the case, for it is stated that "there is no controversy as
to the facts, valuations or computation of the tax." After agreeing with counsel for the Commonwealth that the tax is not on
property or on net income but is an excise measured by property
and net income, Mr. Justice McReynolds declared that "the right
to lay taxes on tangible property or on income is not involved;
and the inquiry comes to this: May a state impose upon a foreign corporation which transacts only interstate business within
43268 U. S. 2o3 (1925), noted in (i926) 39 HAiv. L. REV. 396. The contrary decision in the state court is discussed in Lyon, State Taxation of Foreign CorporationsEngaged in Interstate Commerce, io BuIZ. NAT.TAX Ass'X
'37; and notes in (1923) 12 CAL. L. REv. 39 and (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 4o6.
The principal case is considered in some of the articles cited in note 44 infra.
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her borders an excise tax measured by a combination of two
factors: the proportion of the total value of capital shares
attributed to transactions therein, and the proportion of net income attributed to such transactions ?" To this he answered that
"the excise was demanded on account of interstate business" and
that "any such excise burdens interstate commerce and is therefore invalid without regard to measure or amount." Later he
added that "the amount demanded is unimportant when there is
no legitimate basis for the tax." Thus it appears that states
which hope to get revenue from corporations which confine
themselves to interstate commerce should call their tax, not an
excise on doing business, but a tax on property or on net income. Shakespeare's dictum about the rose is repudiated by the
authoritative expositors of the commerce clause, with the exception of Mr. Justice Brandeis who announced his dissent from
44
the decision.
While it has been established that a state may not as an
exercise of the police power require a certificate of convenience
as a prerequisite to conducting interstate motor-vehicle transportation for hire upon the highways of the state, 45 Clark v.
"For general articles on the effect of the commerce clause on taxability
and on measurement of the tax see Darling, The Rights and Powers of a State
to Tax Foreign Corporationsas Defined by the Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, i BULL. NAT. TAX ASS'N 115; Dudley, State Classification
and the Commerce Clause, 7 BULL NAT. TAX ASS'N 40; Isaacs, The Law
of Foreign Corporatitons, (1926) 12 Am. B. A. J. 707; Constitutional Aspects
of Taxation, (1927) 13 AM. B. A. J. 125; The Federal Protection of Foreign
Corporation, (1926).26 CoL L. REV. 263; The Subject and Measure of Taxation, (1926) 26 Co. L. REv. 939; and Busitess a4d Property Taxes, (1926)
36 YAL L. J. 195; Kessler, Some Legal Problems of State Personal Income
Taxatim;, (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 759, 863; Long, Present Status of the State
Inconw Tax as a Business Tax, (1926) PROC. 18TH ANN. CONF. NAT. TAX
Ass'N (1925) 151; Porter, State Excise Taxes as Limited by the Federal Constitutlon, (1924) PROC. 16TH ANN. CoNF. NAT. TAX ASS'N (1923) 116; and
Powell, Business Taxes and the Federal Constitution, (1926) PROC. I8TH ANN.
CONF. NAT. TAX Ass'N (1925)

164.

"Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925), and Bush & Sons Co. v.
Maloy, 267 U. S. 317 (1925).

For notes on these cases see (1925)

14 CAL, L.

REv. 58; (1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 67o; (1925) io ComR. L. Q. 518; (1927) 40
HuAv. L. REv. 882; (1925) 2o IL. L. REV. 3o9; and (1925) II VA. L. REG.
(N.

S.)

114.

The general problem of state power over motor vehicles in

interstate commerce is discussed in Gavit, State Highways and Interstate Motor
Transportation, (1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 559; Gordon, Preservation of Balance
Between Federal and State Powers of Public Utility Regudation, (1922) 47
REP. Am. BAR ASS'N 661; Gregory, Some Phasesof Public Utility Law, (192o)
45 REP. Am. BAR Ass'N 447; Rosenbaum and Lilienthal, Motor Carrier Regu-
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holds that such motor-vehicle common carriers engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce may be required to pay not
only the ordinary automobile license fee but an extra fee demanded of all common motor carriers for the declared object
of maintaining the highways. That the case goes somewhat further is to be inferred from the following paragraph in Mr. justice Brandeis's opinion:
Poor40

"There is no suggestion that the tax discriminates
against interstate commerce. Nor is it suggested that the tax
is so large as to obstruct interstate commerce. It is said
that all of the tax is not used for maintenance and repair
of the highways; that some of it is used for defraying the
expenses of the commission in the administration or enforcement of the act, and some for other purposes. Since the
tax is assessed for a proper purpose and is not objectionable in amount, the use to which the proceeds are put is not
a matter which concerns the plaintiffs."

The
cate
cate
deis

47

case seems to hold also that a state may demand a certifias a condition prerequisite to using the roads if the certifiwill be granted upon paying the tax, for Mr. Justice Bransays:
"The plaintiffs did not apply for a certificate or offer to
pay the taxes. They refused or failed to do so, not because
insurance was demanded, but because of the belief that,
being engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, they could
not be required to apply for a certificate or to pay the tax.
Their claim was unfounded."

48

This may be dictum, for all the case does is to uphold the District Court in denying an injunction to restrain the state officers from enforcing the Act. This does not necessarily involve
latio; Federal, State and Municipal, (1926) 26 CoL. L. REv. 954; Tooke, The
Centralization of Control of Highway Traffic, (1926) 14 GEo. L. 3. 256, reprinted in (1926) 6o Am. L. REv. 741; and notes in (1926) 21 ILT. L. RE .
166; (1927) 2 IND. L. J. 665; and (1925) 9 MiNN. L. RFv. 572.
48274 U. S. 554 (1927).
In (1925) 9 MiNx. L. REv. 572, is a note on
the taxability of a commercial motor vehicle engaged in interstate

274 U. S. 554, 557.
"274 U. S. 554, 558.
C

commerce.
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a holding that the certificate must be obtained prior to use of
the highways. The general rule has been assumed to be that
payment of a concededly valid tax cannot be made a prerequisite
to the conduct of interstate commerce. 49 Mr. justice Brandeis
may be meaning to depart from this rule where the so-called
tax in issue is of the kind that may be regarded as a fee for the
use of facilities furnished by the state, or he may have meant to
confine his remark to the particular ruling that the initial refusal
to enjoin should not be reversed because it was not until a later
state of the proceedings that it became clear that the state commission would not insist that the complainant take out liability
and cargo insurance.50
The railroad corporations subjected to what was called by
North Carolina a net-income tax objected in Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Co. v. Daughton 51 that the tax was not confined to net
income, since it did not permit them to deduct payments for interest and rentals. This was answered by pointing out that the
tax was on the net income of the operated property in the state
rather than on the net income of the operator. 52 It thus appears
that the owner of an interstate railroad who may in fact make no
money may be compelled to pay a tax on the net income which
the railroad operations yield. That income is available to some'See Pullman Co. v. Richardson, 261 U. S. 330, 340 (1923), note 70
infra, and cases cited.
' The commerce clause was not adduced in New York, etc., Telegraph Co.
v. Dolan, 265 U. S. 96 (1924), which sustained as against complaints founded
on the Fourteenth Amendment a municipal assessment on telegraph lines imposed under a statute authorizing the assessment at not less than $66oo and
not more than $73oo for each mile of the streets used. The state court had
held that the tax was a privilege tax and had thus avoided the difficulty created
by the arbitrary limits set to the assessment, and the Supreme Court was satisfied with the name and the demeanor of the exaction.
1262 U. S. 413 (1923).

' 1An earlier ruling that the federal tax on net income is not, when applied
to the net income of an exporting enterprise, a tax on imports was reaffirmed
in National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U. S. 373 (1924), and Barclay
& Co. v. Edwards, 267 U. S. 44z (I925), discussed in (1925) 24 MICH. L.
REv. 204. The cases held it proper for Congress to tax the full income of

domestic corporations derived from manufacture in the United States and sales
to other countries, although in the Act of 1918 corporations foreign to the
United States were exempted from a tax on income derived from manufacture
or purchase of goods in the United States which they sold or disposed of to
foreign countries, and in the Act of 1921 they were taxed only on such part
of that income as was assumed to be derived from the manufacture.
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body and the state taxes only net income though it may tax it
all to the immediate recipient and not allow him to deduct what
he has to pass on to others who have provided part of the capital
by purchase of bonds. The fact that the reports required by the
state commission involved departures from the uniform system
of accounting prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission was found not to result in an invalid regulation of interstate
commerce over which Congress had assumed control, since
the accounting prescribed by the Commission was for limited
purposes and was not designed to be conclusive for all purposes.
In noting that the tax did not discriminate against interstate
commerce Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that "the taxable
net income of other public-service corporations is determined also
without allowing capital charges as a deduction," thus implying
that there is no discrimination against interstate commerce because transportation companies are treated differently from mercantile and manufacturing concerns. An issue as to an excessive
burden on interstate commerce resulting from the aggregate of
the various North Carolina taxes on railroads was said to have
been settled by another decision.
A contention that the state of West Virginia was imposing
a tax on the gross proceeds of natural gas sold and delivered
in interstate commerce was held to be unfounded in Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall 53 for the reason that the state court had
held that the state might take account of the gross proceeds "only
for the purpose of determining the value of such commodity
within the state and before it enters interstate commerce." The
complainant conceded that the state may tax the value at the
well, but insisted that the state court in its opinion had sanctioned
a method of computing that value which in reality took account
of the increment due to interstate transportation and sales. To
this Mr. Justice McReynolds answered that the Supreme Court
reviews the final decree and "must accept the statute as au83274 U. S. 284 (1927), noted in (927)
40 HARv.L. REv. 9o8. For notes
on the taxation of merchants and manufacturers engaged also in interstate commerce see (1926) 24 MIcH. L. REv. 62.3 and (1926) 11 ST. Louis L. REv. 244.
A tax on motion picture films is considered in (1925) 35 YALE L. J. io9.
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thoritatively construed and applied," under which "the plain
result of the opinion and final decree is to require that the tax
be computed upon the value of the gas at the well, and not
otherwise." To this he added that "if, hereafter, executive
officers disregard the approved construction and fix values upon
any improper basis, appropriate relief may be obtained through
the courts." Just how far the Supreme Court will go in inquiring whether what professes to be a finding of value at the well
does in fact. include value contributed by interstate commerce
must be open to doubt. The issue is one of fact and judgment
upon which ordinarily the findings of administrative officers are
immune from judicial reversal. Yet the courts go into such
questions in order to determine whether there is discrimination
and there is equal reason to do so when the issue is whether the
state in the guise of taxing value at the well is in fact taxing
some of the gross prbceeds from interstate commerce.5 4
"In an earlier controversy between West Virginia and a pipe-line company involving a tax of 2 cents per barrel on petroleum transported, the court
had held the tax invalid as to such part of the oil as it adjudged to be in course
of interstate transit from its entrance into the pipes, but had observed that it
was admitted that the tax might be levied with respect to a designated quantity
of oil which left the pipes before the pipes left the state. When the case went
back to the state court under the mandate of the Supreme Court, the state
court declared the whole tax invalid. It was urged in Hallanan v. Eureka Pipe
Line Co., 261 U. S. 393 (1923)., that this was not in conformity with the mandate from above, but the Supreme Court held that its previous expression
merely indicated the constitutional power of the stafe and conveyed no intimation as to whether the state statute was separable so that the tax on part of
the oil could be sustained when the tax on the rest was squashed. This is a
peculiarly state question which the state court may decide for itself. The same
ruling was made in Hallanan v. United Fuel Gas Co., 261 U. S. 398 (1923).

(To be concluded.)

